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This study reviewed the opinions and concerns expressed
by various government and private industry sources with
regard to the use and structure of escalation (i.e., economic
price adjustment) provisions in government procurement con-
tracting. There was found to be little general agreement
among these sources on many of the aspects of escalation
provisions, including the "proper" objectives of such clauses.
After this review a framework was designed to facilitate
the analysis of the relationship of escalation provisions and
price level uncertainty. The specific model employed examined
interacting objectives of the government and a firm in a
sole-source contract negotiation scenario. A method was de-
veloped to approximate the increase in contract price required
by the firm as compensation for accepting the risk of uncertain
price levels. A criterion was established for the employment
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1. The Impact of Inflation
By July of 1974, consumer prices, as measured by the
Consumer Price Index, had risen to 147% of their 1967 level
and had shown the sharpest annual rise, 11.1%, since 1947.
At the same time that this inflation is reflected in greatly
increased nominal dollar program costs for the Department of
Defense (as for other producers and consumers) , Congressional
reaction to inflation has been, in part, to place tighter
constraints on the budget of the DoD. Thus the final impact
on DoD of the current inflation has been a constant-dollar




Treatment of Inflation in Private-Sector Contracts
In private sector procurement contracting, there are
several methods of alleviating the effects of inflation, in
particular, and uncertain price levels, in general:
(i) contingency pricing
With this method, the contractor projects his
estimates of wage and material price changes over the term of
the contract, and adds a contingency sum to the estimates to
These figures are from Department of Labor computations
as reported in Ref. 1: p. 1,4.
2 Department of Defense, [2; p. 7,23].

protect himself from the possibility of having under-estimated
the price changes.
(ii) escalation provisions
A variety of pricing clauses fall under this
heading, including
(a) graduated price schedules; the later the
delivery, the higher the price.
(b) "escalators"; whether based on experienced
cost increases or on the movements of price indices, these
compensate the contractor for cost increases during contract
performance.
(iii) price at time of delivery
Although an estimate of the future actual price
may be given, the contractor is not bound to it; rather, he
determines the price after all his costs are known, at the
time of shipment or delivery.
3 . Treatment of Inflation in DoD Contracts
In DoD procurement contracting, the existence of
contingency factors is recognized, but at present only cer-
tain broad types of "escalators" are generally authorized
for use in prime contracts. These, as defined by the Armed
4Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) Committee, are:
"(i) adjustment based on established prices - price
adjustments are based on an increase or decrease from
an agreed-upon level in published or established prices
3Logistics Management Institute, [3; p. 13]
4 Department of Defense, [4; p. 5] .

of either specific items or price levels of contract end
items.
(ii) adjustment based on labor or material costs
(Actual Costs Method) - price adjustments are based on
an increase or decrease in specified costs of labor or
material actually experienced by the contractor during
performance of the contract.
(iii) adjustment based on labor or material costs
(Cost Index Method) - price adjustments are based on an
increase or decrease from specified labor or material
cost standards or indices made applicable to the
contract .
"
The problem of when to use escalation clauses (as
opposed to contingency factors for uncertain price levels)
is necessarily related to the problem of the "proper" struc-
ture of those clauses. In May of 1968, the Logistics
Management Institute (LMI) published a study addressing some
elements of both problems. The Institute's major recommenda-
tions were:
"(i) The use of escalation provisions is generally
to be preferred to adding estimates of future price level
changes in contract prices.
(ii) Indexes should encompass the widest possible
industrial base compatible with the objectives of escala-
tion provisions to avoid the possibility that contractors
may influence the index and that escalation adjustments
may contribute to spiraling price levels.
The terms "escalators" and "escalation clauses" are in
common use to refer to compensating adjustments for uncer-
tain prices; however, ASPR has adopted the term "economic
price adjustment clauses" instead to avoid ambiguity since
such clauses apply to both inflationary and deflationary
price movements.
Logistics Management Institute, [3; p. 3].

(iii) Escalation provisions should not require audit
or statement of actual costs as a condition for applying
the escalation adjustment.
(iv) Escalation provisions should be included in
all multi-year procurement contracts and in contracts
containing priced options.
(v) Studies should be made to determine the appro-
priate labor and material indexes for ... major commodity
areas where long-term contracts are employed."
These recommendations resulted primarily from LMI '
s
conclusions that "constant dollar" pricing was the preferred
method of paying for escalation, that the only "escalation"
to be compensated for should be that due purely to general
economic trends and outside the influence of the individual
contractor, and that suitable indexes could be chosen or
constructed to reflect such trends. Additionally, LMI recom-
mended that there be no ceiling or floor to the amount of
the adjustment provided by an escalation clause, that such
adjustments should be made without regard to contract de-
livery date, that target costs and ceiling price should be
reset to reflect escalation, and that an increment of pro-
7fit should be included in any escalation adjustment.
In 1969, in comment on LMI's study, the Navy
Secretariat generally disagreed with the recommendations of
that study, stating that the consensus of opinion of senior
Navy contracting personnel was that prospective (i.e., con-
tingency factor) pricing was strongly preferred to more ex-
tensive use of escalation clauses. The principal reason
7 Logistics Management Institute, [3; p. 53-57]
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given was that, "As generally recognized, prospective pricing,
by its very nature, encourages management attention to per-
formance within firm budgets and provides a significant in-
o
ducement to proficiency in performance." The Navy did agree,
however, to the possible need for wider use of escalation
clauses, on a selective basis, where long-term contracts and
highly unstable prices might make price projections too un-
reliable for use of prospective pricing. It was also agreed
that, when escalation clauses were used, indexes with the
widest possible bases should be chosen and that audits of
actual costs should not be required. The remaining areas of
disagreement appeared to stem from the Navy's desire to main-
tain maximal incentives on the contractor to exert strong
managerial control on his costs and on meeting his contracted
delivery data; in particular, the Navy responded negatively
to LMI ' s contention that escalation should continue to be
9paid on delayed deliveries, and should have no ceiling.
The position taken, with respect to the use of esca-
lation clauses, by private industry was typified by a letter
from the Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations




Office of the Secretary of the Navy, [5; p. 2-3].
gIbid, j p . 3- 7 .




"The first and strongest conviction of these as-
sociations is that the inclusion in the ASPR of guide-
lines for Price Escalation Clauses would significantly
improve the realism of price proposals. The importance
of the need for this improvement cannot be over-empha-
sized. We believe that there is a general understanding
that, without this improvement, the continuation of
"cost-growth" on many large procurements will undeni-
ably have the effect of stifling our defense efforts
to the danger point. It is furthermore undeniable that
the rate of inflation in recent years has been one of
the principal contributing factors to this "cost-
growth" situation; and it may continue to remain one."
..."In summary, it appears that the bulk of informed
opinion does favor the use of escalation provisions;
provided that suitable indexes exist or can be developed."
The importance of "suitable indexes," as mentioned
above, was underscored by a letter, forwarded to the Secre-
tary of the Navy by a United States Senator, from a potential
competitor for the shafting systems contract for the Navy's
Patrol Frigate program. The letter presented some evidence
that the Navy's chosen material price level index for the
escalation clause of this long-term contract did not ac-
curately reflect price level changes within the industry
concerned and that, if a suitable index were not adopted,
"[this company], and others interested in this shafting pro-
curement, will thus be in a non-responsive position relative
to the Patrol Frigate Program contract terms on price escala-
tion..." This particular company did not indicate a desire
to use an index structured from its own individual data;
rather, it had constructed a "suitable" index from a set of
indexes, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
,
National Forge Company, [7; p. 2-3]
12

by "weighting" each index and summing. Such a method is used
in some Navy shipbuilding escalation clauses, but at a higher
level of aggregation.
Besides the problem of choosing the proper index,
there is the problem of how to best use the index to compute
escalation payments. LMI noted that sub-contract commitments
were generally made, and priced, some time before the ex-
penses were actually incurred, but that escalation was com-
puted at the latter time, due to expenditure rather than
12
commitment accounting methods . LMI concluded that, for
major subcontracts, escalation should be computed at time
13
of commitment, not actual expenditure. At present, this
is not being done; rather, in long-term negotiated procure-
ments, the expenditure rates and relative cost weights (con-
tract profile and contract mix) of labor and material are
set at the time of negotiations and are not changed to re-
flect actual commitments or expenditures. In competitive
contracts, the contracting officer unilaterally specifies
the above rates and weights, based on the average profiles
of all companies to be solicited. In regard to this method
for competitive contracts, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) has expressed concern that,
1
2
Logistics Management Institute, [3; p. 44-46]
llIhid., p. 47.
Department of Defense, [4; p. 9-12].
13

"Because such advance provisions based on averages
can be unrealistic to the offerors' plans for contract
performance, each offeror can be expected to increase
or decrease his offered price for the provisions which
do not conform to his contract performance plans. These
actions can result in estimates for inflation being a
substantial factor in proposed prices. "15
Concern has also been expressed by the Naval Ship
Systems Command, and others, that care must be taken to
avoid "gamesmanship" with respect to the contracted expendi-
ture rates and mix. Such "gamesmanship" could also result
from the manner of computing escalation payments, as previous-
ly mentioned.
Finally, there still appears to be some conceptual
disagreement among various DoD institutions as to the objec-
tives of escalation provisions. The Naval Material Command ^




(i) The system should provide coverage adequate to
substantially remove contingencies for economic unknowns
while retaining adequate incentives for the contractor
to maintain control of his unit labor and material costs.
(ii) The measure to which escalation is paid must be
objectively determinable so that disputes are avoided.
(iii) The cost and effort associated with the func-
tioning and administration of the system should be minimal.
The above objectives agree, generally, with those
espoused by other Systems Commands, all of whom appear oriented
General Accounting Office, [8; p. 2],
Naval Ship Systems Command, [9; encl. 1, p. 1]
17Naval Material Command, [10; p. 1-2].
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toward the use of escalation provisions to minimize the cost
of a given program. At the policy-setting levels, there are
additional, and occasionally conflicting, objectives concern-
ing the overall defense budget. In particular, the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Logistics has
stated that,
"The more we can do to continue to separate [infla-
tion-caused] cost growth from those that the Defense
Department has normally been charged, the better our
image will be. ...These budget elements (procurement
and escalation) should remain as separate as possible."
In reply to the memorandum containing the above
statement, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial
19Management stated that,
"OSD does attempt to separate and identify escalation
to the Hill whenever possible, but the policy of doing
so does not dominate their overall review and presenta-
tion of the budget. [There are instances] where their
concern for the availability of prior year assets and
the makeup of the budget overrode any concern they may
have for identifying and funding escalation separately."
The ASPR Committee appears most concerned with the
"pure" economics of the government- industry relationship.
Their objectives with respect to escalation provisions was
summed up in one sentence,
"[This is] the crux of the entire escalation concept;
i.e., to reimburse the contractor for economic fluctuations
beyond his control."
I o
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and
Logistics), [11; p. 1] .
19
' Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management)
,
[12; p. 2].




4 . Summary of the Situation
The entire question of escalation clauses appears
unresolved, even to the extent that the proper objectives
of escalation provisions have not been agreed upon among the
agencies which direct their use and those which must apply
the provisions. The "ideal" structure of escalation clauses
and of any indexes used therein remains subject to contro-
versy. Finally, there is no general agreement as to the
proper method for computing and paying escalation adjustments,
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The areas of controversy with regard to escalation pro-
visions appeared both too wide and too interrelated to be
able to concentrate on any one (e.g.; structure of indexes,
when to use some form of an escalation clause, etc.) without
first obtaining a more thorough understanding of how escala-
tion provisions affect a firm's attitude toward inflation,
or uncertain price levels, and how this attitude is reflected
in its pricing of a contract. To this end, it was felt
necessary to "start fresh"; to develop an analytical frame-
work which would both permit such an understanding of the
theoretic nature of escalation provisions and provide the
basis for further, more detailed investigation of the effects
of employing differing types of escalation provisions.
16

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANALYSIS
The analysis was designed to examine the contractual
objectives of both the government and the firm, the require-
ments to jointly meet these objectives (in a negotiation, as
compared to a competitive bid, situation) , and the changes
in such requirements due to successive "uncertainties." In
particular, it was desired to isolate and examine changes
due to uncertain price levels.
The notation and initial formulation drew heavily on
the works of Sandmo [Ref . 14] and Baron [Ref . 15] , combining
theoretic elements of each to best meet the purpose of the
study.
A. THE MODEL OF THE FIRM
The firm was assumed to be competitive in its private-
sector production operations. Since it was desired to examine
the firm's behavior under uncertainty, it was also assumed
that the firm was a maximizer of expected utility of future
wealth and that it was risk averse. Finally, the model was
static and thus (to eventually introduce uncertain contract
costs) it was assumed that contract costs were paid by the
firm upon completion of the contract, at which time the




The alternative, that the firm paid all costs at the




The problem faced by the firm at the time of contract
negotiation was two-fold:
(i) allocation of initial wealth between a "riskless"
asset and production in the private sector, and




W = initial wealth of the firm
o
W = wealth of the firm at the end of the term of the
contract (whether or not it was actually accepted)
M = amount invested in the "riskless" asset, which
gave rate of return (1+r) over the term of the
contract
S(x) = cost of producing output quantity x in the private
sector
R = market -clearing price of a unit of the firm's
private-sector output
C = cost of performing the work specified by the
contract
C = contract target cost
a = contract profit rate where aC. was "target profit";
a >
B = incentive profit rate where B(C -C) was paid to
the firm if C > C and by the firm to the govern-
ment if C
t
< C;"0 < 3 < 1.
The firm's initial allocation possibilities were given by:
WQ
= M + S(x). (1)
Its future wealth was then determined by:









1 if contract were accepted
if contract were rejected .






+ r) + [Rx - (l+r)S(x)] + 5 [ (a+S)C t -SC] . (3)
If B = 1, the contract was of the Fixed Cost-Fixed Fee
type; if B = 0, it was of the Cost Plus Fixed Fee Type.
With E representing the expectation operator, the firm's
problem was then formulated as:
max E{U[W (1 + r) + Rx -(l + r)S(x) + 5 ( (a+B)C. -BC) ] } (4)
x,<5 °
z
subject to x >
6 e {0,1}.
The firm's preference ordering over wealth, represented
by U(W), was required to be monotonic increasing (for all
positive utility levels) and unique up to a positive linear




.for all W 3 u(W) >
(5)
(6)
B. THE MODEL OF THE GOVERNMENT
The government was assumed to be an expected cost minimizer
with the constraint that the contract must be awarded to the
19

particular firm described in the preceding section. The
contract parameters a and 3 were assumed to be pre-determined,
The government then had to negotiate the contract target cost,
Using the previous notation, the government's problem
was formulated as:
min E[6(ct+B)C - gC]
subject to 5 = 1 . (7)
C
t
C. THE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS ANALYSIS
1. The Negotiations Model
This model represented the interaction, through
negotiation, of the previous models of the firm and the govern-
ment by defining a problem whose solution satisfied the ob-









= max E{U[W (1+r) + Rx - (l+r)S(x)]} (8)
x
The C which satisfied (8) was then the minimum tar-
get cost such that the firm was indifferent between accepting
22
and rejecting the contract.
It was recognized that this condition did not guarantee
acceptance, since the firm was indi f Cerent to the contract.
Such indifference, however, was assumed to result in acceptance
20

2 . The Certainty Solution
Under complete certainty conditions (i.e., R, S(x),




max {Rx - (l + r)S(x) + (a+g)C - 3C}
x
= max {Rx - (l+r)S(x) } .
x
(9)
For a unique and internal optimal output to exist in
the firm's private sector production, it was necessary to as-
sume increasing marginal costs of the factors of production.
With this assumption made, the first and second-order condi-
tions for private-sector optimality were:
R - (l+r)S' (x) = (10)
and
-(l+r)S"(x) < 0, respectively. (11)
With complete certainty, equations (10) and (11) held
for both sides of the equality constraint of (9) and there-
fore a unique x optimized both. This implied that, for the
equality to hold, the solution to (9) was:
t a+3 *
3. Risk Aversion as Applied to the Negotiations Model
a. Risk Aversion Functions
The Arrow-Pratt functions of absolute and relative
risk aversion allowed further specification of the firm's at-




Absolute Risk Aversion; FA (W) = - grjS- (13)
Relative Risk Aversion; F
R
(W) = - rjr-fft W . (14)
The meaning o£ these functions was characterized
23
"If the amount invested in the risky asset
increases (decreases) with wealth, the investor
has decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aver-
sion. If the fraction of wealth invested in the
risky asset increases (decreases) with wealth,
the investor has decreasing (increasing) rela-
tive risk aversion."
This analysis made the assumption of decreasing
absolute risk aversion; however, no assumption was made with
respect to relative risk aversion since none appeared capable
of adding any qualitative value to the analysis or facilitated
the interpretation of its results.
b. The Risk Aversion Increment
With U as previously defined, and under the as-






)], Wt ~ f(W t ). (15)
The certainty equivalent 3 D, was defined such
that: 24
\ U(D) = E[U(Wt )]. (16)
D, then was the dollar amount such that the firm
was indifferent to accepting D with certainty or taking the
risky action with expected outcome E(W.).
*7 1




[17; p. 46] .
22

The risk aversion increment , also a dollar amount,
25





] - D. (17)
From the definition of D and equation (5), as-
suming the condition on it held, it was assured that I (W )
was positive.
Using these definitions, the following maximiza-
tion statements were equivalent:
max E[U(W
t )]
X"S max U(D) (from definition of D)




t )] (from definition of I (W ) .
(18)
The solution constraint of the negotiations model
was then restated in the format of (18) as:
max{E[W (1+r) + Rx - (l+r)S(x) + (a+3)C -3C] - I (wj)
}
x °
= max {E[W (1+r) + Rx - (l+r)S(x)] - I (W*) } (19)
x °
where the superscripts of I (W ) and I (W ) were used to denote
the risk aversion increments with and without the contract,
respectively.
c. The Risk Aversion Increment as a Function of the
Mean and Variance of Future Wealth
With the assumption that the probability distri-




could be approximated by its quadratic expansion, the risk
aversion increment was re-expressed as:
where
and
1 = ICyW ' VW > ( 21 )
t t
^w
= E (Wt ) (22)
V
w
= E(W£) - [E(W
t )]
z (the variance of W ). (23)








It was noted that the signs of the partial deriva-
tives in (24) were determined by the assumptions of risk
aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion as:
Risk Aversion r^ ^P— > (25)
Decreasing Absolute^ 31 _ , ,.
Risk Aversion =p 8y„ u ' l- zt)J
4
.
The General First-Order Optimality Condition with
Uncertainties
Assuming statistical independence between uncertain








(l+r) + y Rx - (l+r)S(x) + (a+3)Ct - Sy c
(where y D and y were E(R) and E(C), respectively), and theK C
variance of future wealth was:
\ - x2°R + * 2 ° 2c (28)
24

(where an and a* were the variances of R and C, respectively,
and o R and a were the standard deviations of each).
Then, with I as postulated above, the first-order
optimality condition for the left-hand side of the equality con-
straint of (19) was:
[y R













5v { 2xa R dx




} = . (29)
W
t
Rearranging terms, (29) becomes:
31 (W?) 31 (Wj)




31 (Wj) 31 (w£)
+ { (a+B) [1 - ]} dC - (3[1 - Z ]} dudy
w t dyw crv
t t
" { 232a
c ~1V^ } da c = °- ^
t
For the right-hand side of the equality constraint,









The next assumption made dealt with qualifying the
definition of minimum, contract target price. In particular,
it was assumed that the government had, as a second objective,
that the private-sector output of the firm not change as a
result of taking the contract. This assumption changed the
formulation of the contract negotiations problem to:
min C.
subject to:
E[W (1 + r) + Rx* - (l+r)S(x*) + (a+BK
t
" SC] - I (w£)
and
n-










The second constraint of (32) implied that each side
of the first constraint must be optimized, with respect to x,
at private sector output x*.
This in turn implied that, in equation (30):
si (wj;) 31 cwj;) ^^
[y R
- (l + r)S'(x*)][l - *-] - 2x*a| t- = Q>
w
t t




- (l+r)S> (x*)] - 2x*aR <
[y R
- (l+r)S' (x*) ] - 2x*0
26
(34)






respectively, implying that (for a 2 > 0)
:(% r (36)3I(W*) // 3I(WjA|
J
3I(w£) A 8IfW^)V
It was noted that (36) was not a restriction on the
utility function of the firm; rather, it was the result of
the added assumption concerning the objectives of the
government
.
With reference to equation (30) , since the coeffi-
cient of dx was shown to be zero (by equation (33)), the
first-order optimality condition became, after rearranging
terms
:
h 1^ /i, 3i ofou (3?
(ci-:-3) dC - pdu + 2 3 2 o { av /! - L p da
| wt / v dX/|












5 . Examination of the Effect of Adding Individual
Uncertainties
a. Market-Clearing Price Uncertainty
With R (of mean y n and variance a 2.) as the onlyK K
uncertainty, then using equation (38) required considering C
as deterministic (and equal to u ) so that a 2 was identically









In this case, the solution was the same as for
the complete certainty case as previously presented:
C
t
= Ik ' (40)
b. Contract Cost Uncertainty Added
With C also a random variable, having mean u
and variance a 2
,
equation (38) applied directly, and is not
restated here.
It was noted that, from (38), the requisite
change in C. to maintain optimality at the same private sec-
tor output level consisted of two distinct parts, one a
result of a "pure" increment in the mean of contract costs,
the other a result of a "pure" increment in the standard
deviation of those costs. That the first was positive was
obvious; for the second, it was only necessary to note that
[u R - (l+r)S'(x*)] was the expected marginal profit (in the
private sector) to assure that it was also positive.
6 . Approximating the Effect of Uncertain Price Levels
The purpose of this section was to investigate the
impact on C of changes in the price levels of the factors
making up contract cost. To this end, the effect of uncer-
tain price levels in the private sector was not explicitly
examined, but rather it was assumed that any effects were
compensatory, within the private sector, so that neither x*,
9 A
Equation (40) was the definite integral:
C
C = / —^75- dp ; with C known
t O a+3 c'
28

nor the value of [u R - (l+r)S'(x*)] of equation (38), would
have changed.
The random variable, y, having mean u and variance
a*, was defined as the "inflation factor" (with negative
















) = V(Y )V(C) + [E(Y )] 2 V(C) + [E(C)] 2 V( Y )
(41)
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Equation (38) was then rewritten in the form of an
approximation as:








- (l + r)S'(x*)




where A represented "incremental change in..."
In this case, the incremental changes were the re-
sult of adding the uncertain y to the problem. In particular
Ay =uu -u = u (u -1)
c y C c c v y
(44)
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It was recognized that such an approximation was only
valid in a small neighborhood of the optimal solution values;
however, it was considered to be sufficient for the purpose.
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Acr = (a 2 a 2 + y 2 a 2 + u 2 a 2 )^ - a
c v y c Y c c y c
i (45)
= [a 2 (a 2 + y 2 ) + u 2 a 2 ]^ - a .1 c v y Y c y c
The approximation equation, (43) , used in conjunction
with (44) and/or (45) could then be used to approximate the
change in C caused by uncertain price levels. The expanded
form of the approximation equation was:
26 2 a fy - (l+r)S'(x*)"1
Ac
t - ^h K<v 1)] +w \ 2x* a| j
(46)
•{[o 2 (o 2 + y 2 ) + ]i 2 a 2 ] h - a }.
••
-V. v ^y J p c y j cc v. Y
-
y - -
7. The Alternative of the "Economic Price Adjustment
(EPA)" Clause
It was noted that C.
,
as developed, consisted of both
a charge, to the government, for reimbursement of expected
target cost and an additional charge, the "contingency price,"
due to the uncertainty of that contract cost. Although in
practice the government has been willing to absorb such con-
tingency costs in return for less cost uncertainty accruing
to itself, it has indicated an unwillingness to do so with
regard to the increase in contingency costs resulting from
price level uncertainty (specifically, uncertain inflation).
One alternative to paying such increases in contin-
gency prices is the "economic price adjustment (EPA)" clause
in government procurement contracts. In concept, such a
clause protects the contractor from inflation by directly
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reimbursing him for increased costs due purely to inflation-
ary trends within the economy, while maintaining cost reduc-
tion incentives on the contractor.
No "typical" EPA clause, such as those authorized by
the Armed Services Procurement Regulations, was applied to
the negotiations model developed in this study; rather, it
was assumed that the EPA clause available for application
by the government would exactly compensate the firm for any
cost increases due purely to inflation. It was also assumed
that the employment of the EPA clause would result in a known
administrative cost, P, which accrued solely to the government
Under the above assumptions, and the previous develop-
ment of the model, the firm was indifferent between:
(i) taking the risk inherent to the price level
uncertainty and requiring the compensatory change in C. (as
approximated by equation (46) , and
(ii) foregoing any such compensatory change in C and
accepting the EPA clause.
The government was not necessarily indifferent, how-
ever, due to the administrative cost, P, and the assumption
that it was an expected cost minimizer. The government's
problem, with respect to the EPA clause, was





1 if EPA clause were adopted
= i (47)
if EPA clause were rejected
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and AC represented the firm's requisite change in the target
cost due to uncertain price levels (as previously developed
and approximated by equation (46)).
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III. REVIEW OF THE ASSUMPTIONS WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER
STUDY
A. SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS
1. Sole-Source Negotiated Contract
The assumption that the contract was negotiated with
a single firm, rather than competitively bid, was made to
enable examination of the effect on target price due purely
to varying price levels, without the added uncertainty of
the award of the contract.
The assumed sole-source negotiation case is the
actual case for many major government procurement contracts,
but most are either competitive or awarded using a combina-
2 8tion of the two methods. In this regard, the problem of
risk-aversion incentives causing a firm to bid low (in com-
parison to risk-indifferent behavior) on a competitive con-
tract has been addressed by Baron [Ref. 15], but in a form




Firm Competitive in the Private Sector
This assumption initially appeared to be a virtual
necessity to develop the approximation for contract price.
It was decided, however, that if a suitable proxy (e.g.,
"expected profits from all investments other than the contract")
were defined, then the assumption as used could be discarded.
28 Belden, D. L. and Cammack, E. G., [18; p. 102-114]
33

It was believed that the principal value of the
"competitive" assumption would lie in its application in an
investigation of the firm's incentives to maintain control
over inflationary trends within its own organization after
receiving a contract with an EPA clause. On an intuitive
level, if the firm desired to remain competitive in the
private sector, and if each individual factor of production
were perfectly substitutable between the private and public
sector operations of the firm, then the above incentives
would not be affected by the firm's taking a public-sector
contract with an EPA clause.
3
-
Ml Costs of the Contract Paid at Completion of the
Contract "
As mentioned, this assumption was necessary due to
the static nature of the model. An alternative approach
would be to formulate a dynamic model utilizing sequential-
decision theory, including (among others) considerations of
possible early termination, work delays and opportunity costs
associated with the contract. Such' a model would almost cer-
tainly be "more realistic", but would also be far more complex,
B. ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE BEHAVIOR OF THE FIRM AND THEGOVERNMENT
1- The Risk-Averse Nature of the Fi rm
The joint assumptions that the firm maximized expected
utility and that it was risk averse are amply justified in




absolute risk aversion. There did not seem to be any
reason for (or positive value in) deviating from these
assumptions.
The definition of decreasing absolute risk aversion
implied that 8I/8yw was negative, and considerations of
t
boundedness of the utility function led to implications with
regard to the signs of the second partials (specifically,
that 3 2 I/8u
w
2
> and 3 2 I/8VW
2
< 0) which were not actually
used; however, it was not found possible (within the time
constraint of the study) to interpret, analytically, the
concept of relative risk aversion in terms of the risk aver-
sion increment. It was believed that doing so would have
permitted a qualitative interpretation of the term,
and thus obviate the need for qualifying the objectives of
the government.
2 . The Risk-Indifferent Nature of the Government
The assumption that the government was an expected
cost minimizer was equivalent to the assumption of risk in-
difference. This particular assumption, although possibly
reflecting the avowed. government objectives with respect to
any given contract, could well be challenged. In this re-
spect, it appeared that a goal-programming approach to the
government's behavior could prove interesting.
29These assumptions are well discussed in Arrow [Ref. 19],
Sandmo [Ref. 14], and Baron [Ref. 15], among others.
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The definition of the "second objective" of the
government had the same effect as the assumption that the term
was constant would have had. For this reason, it is a "strong"
assumption, and perhaps the most fragile part' of the analysis.
As mentioned, further study of relative risk aversion in
terms of the risk aversion increment could result in discard-
ing this assumption.
C. THE ECONOMIC PRICE ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE
The EPA clause was assumed to fully compensate for vary-
ing price levels since it was not possible, in this initial
formulation, to directly address the problem of maintenance
of control over inflationary trends, which would be re-
quired otherwise.
The assumption that the EPA clause had an associated
administration cost accruing solely to the government was
considered realistic since, with the clause "fully compensa-
tory" the government would need to closely monitor the firm's
costs. Any increase in costs to the firm (e.g.; restructur-
ing its accounting system) were implicitly assumed to be
directly passed on to the government as a certain increase
in contract costs would have been, except that, in this case,
the certain increase only occurred if the EPA clause were
imposed and thus could be included in the administrative cost
of the clause, P.
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IV. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS MODEL ANALYSIS
1. The Incremental Target Cost Approximation
The incremental target cost approximation, equation
(43) , was noted to be valid only in a small neighborhood
about the solution, but was considered sufficient for the
purpose; this was due to using the approximation only to
define a "break-even" relationship between the dollar
increase in price, due to inflation, and the cost of admin-
istering an EPA clause, which was implicitly assumed "small"
compared to the total contract cost.
2
.
Application of the EPA Clause
The analysis led to the conclusion that, under the
assumptions made, the EPA clause should be applied when the
"inflation contingency", as evaluated by the approximation
developed, exceeds the administrative cost of that clause.
3 Effect on Inflation and Cost-Reduction Incentives
The formulation of the model did not permit a direct
analysis of the concurrent problem regarding the effect of
using the EPA clause, as structured, on incentives to main-
tain control over inflationary trends within the firm. The
analysis did not, however, disclose any effect of the EPA
clause (or lack of it) on the cost-reduction incentives as
represented by the incentive profit rate, £, leading to the
conclusion that, if cost -reduction incentives were effective
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without the EPA clause, they would he no less effective with
+.u i 30the clause.
B. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ANALYSIS
The particular contingency price increment approximation
developed was concluded to be too restricted, by the as-
sumption used, to be directly applicable to actual contract
negotiations. Any such restrictions were not considered
binding on the framework of the analysis, however; it was
concluded that further study within the same framework would
allow many of the restrictive assumptions to be relaxed, so
that the results could be of direct use in procurement
contracting.
Finally, the methodology developed in this study appeared
to have one major advantage over others encountered in the
literature; it did not require postulating and parameterizing
a specific utility function (for the firm) as a prerequisite
to its use in quantifying the behavior of the firm under un-
certainty conditions.
30 For a specific analysis of incentive sharing ratios
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